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In 1983 and 1984 the federal courts continued to interpret the changes in
copyright law effectuated by the 1976 Copyright Act.1 During this period the
United States Supreme Court decided its first copyright case since adoption of
the 1976 Act.2 In general, the year's decisions tend to accord expanded copy-
right protection to authors. Several decisions, however, have provoked or
exacerbated uncertainties in a number of areas, including the protection ac-
corded nonfiction works, 3 the "fair use" excuse to copyright infringement, 4
and compliance with the U.S. copyright formality of affixing notice to pub-




In London Film Productions Ltd. v. Intercontinental Communications,
Inc.,6 the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York determined to exercise its subject matter jurisdiction over a British
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1. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982). During the 1983-84 year several bills to amend
the Copyright Act were proposed, and two were passed.
A new Chapter 9 has been added to the Copyright Act providing a ten-year term
of protection for semiconductor chip products, the so-called "mask works." Title III
of H.R. 6163, 98th Cong. 2d Sess. The second piece of legislation is the "Record
Rental Amendment of 1984," Pub. L. No. 98-450, which amends the "first sale" doc-
trine of the Act, 17 U.S.C. § 109(a). Before a record or tape can be leased or rented
for purpose of commercial advantage, the consent of the owners of the copyright in
the sound recording and in the musical works embodied in the recording must now be
obtained.
2. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 774 (1984);
see notes 145-66 infra and accompanying text.
3. See notes 23-29 infra and accompanying text.
4. See notes 153-88 infra and accompanying text.
5. See notes 63-82 infra and accompanying text.
6. 580 F. Supp. 47 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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copyright owner's action alleging that a U.S. defendant had entered into li-
cense agreements with South American film distributors and exhibitors in
violation of plaintiff's exclusive copyrights in several motion pictures. The
American copyrights in the films had expired, but the British copyrights in
the films were still in force, and were protected in the South American coun-
tries under the Berne Convention. 7 The United States, however, is. not a
party to the Berne Convention; the U.S. defendant's South American activi-
ties, therefore, did not violate U.S. laws. The court, in holding that it could
exercise its subject matter jurisdiction, noted that copyright infringement is a
"transitory" cause of action, which "may be adjudicated in the courts of a
sovereign other than the one in which the cause of action arose." Interests
of international reciprocity also supported the exercise of jurisdiction. The
court observed that, just as U.S. courts will entertain claims concerning a
foreign national's alleged violations of U.S. law, the court should hear a claim
concerning a U.S. national's alleged violation of foreign law.9
The court also declined to dismiss the case on the ground that foreign
law would apply. Although the necessity of applying another nation's law is
often a reason for dismissing a case on forum non conveniens grounds,' 0 the
court found that there was no alternative forum for this case.' The court
refused to dismiss an action on forum non conveniens grounds when a plain-
tiff might be left with no forum in which to assert a valid claim.
12
London Films presents an unusual, but not unprecedented, situation.
Although the federal court could not assert subject matter jurisdiction over
the claim based on a violation of a U.S. law, the court did have subject mat-
ter jurisdiction because the action was between a U.S. citizen and a citizen or
subject of a foreign state.
13
The real question in such a case is not whether the court has authority to
hear the claim, but whether a claim involving foreign law ought more prop-
erly to be heard in a foreign court. Dismissal of a case in favor of adjudica-
tion in a foreign court depends upon the American defendant's agreement to
be sued in a foreign country.1 4 Because American defendants may not be
7. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, reprinted
in 3 UNESCO Copyright Laws and Treaties of the World (1979-80).
8. 580 F. Supp. at 49.
9. Id.
10. See, e.g., Bewers v. American Home Prods. Corp., 99 A.D.2d 949, 472
N.Y.S.2d 637 (App. Div. 1984) (dismissing products liability claim on the ground that
court would have to apply English law).
11. 580 F. Supp. at 50. There was no foreign forum in which the defendant was
subject to personal jurisdiction. Id.
12. Id.
13. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (1982) (diversity based on alienage).
14. See, e.g., Schertenlieb v. Traum, 589 F.2d 1156 (2d Cir. 1978); Bewers v.
American Home Prods. Corp., 99 A.D.2d 949, 472 N.Y.S.2d 637 (App. Div. 1984).
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willing to subject themselves to suit abroad, cases of this kind may and should
arise in the U.S. federal courts.1 5
II
STANDING
In Broadcast Music, Ina v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 16 the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York interpreted the
terms of section 501(b) of the 1976 Copyright Act 17 to grant a right of action
only to holders of exclusive rights under copyright. Because Broadcast Mu-
sic, Inc. ("BMI"), a performance rights enforcement society, obtains nonex-
clusive performing rights from song composers, the court held that the
statute precluded BMI from bringing an action in its own right against al-
leged infringers of performing rights in popular songs.18 Rather, the court
held, BMI must join the songs' publishers in order to bring an infringement
action. Recognizing that many different publishers might have to be joined in
the action, the court suggested that BMI seek certification of the publishers as
a plaintiff class pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2).19
Although this case affirms an important statutory limitation on standing
to bring a copyright action, the present Copyright Act is nonetheless more
liberal than its predecessor in according standing to sue. Under the 1976 Act,
any holder of an exclusive right under copyright may bring a copyright
claim.2° The 1976 Act recognizes, for the first time, that rights under copy-
right may be subdivided, transferred in part, and owned separately.2 1 Thus, a
15. A different situation might have been presented had the defendant distrib-
uted the films in the U.S. Under U.S. law, distribution of a copyright-expired film is
not wrongful, regardless of the subsistence of the film's copyright protection in the
foreign copyright owner's home country. In such a case, an American court probably
would have chosen not to apply foreign law, and the foreign plaintiff would have had
no claim. Where, however, the defendant has distributed the work outside the U.S., as
in London Fims, the United States' interest in applying its own law, which would
exculpate the defendant, wanes in relation to the substantial foreign acts and foreign
interests asserted.
16. 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 246 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
17. 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) states in relevant part: "The legal or beneficial owner of
an exclusive right under copyright is entitled... to institute an action for infringe-
ment of that particular right committed while he or she is the owner of it."
18. 221 U.S.P.Q. at 250-51.
19. Id. at 250-52. The court, however, made no ruling on the certification of a
class of plaintiffs. Id. at 252.
20. See note 17 supra. In addition, §501(b) also accords standing to bring an
infringement claim to "beneficial" owners of exclusive rights under copyright, i.e.,
holders of a continuing right to receive royalties. See, e.g., Cortner v. Israel, 732 F.2d
267 (2d Cir. 1984) (composers who had assigned copyright in musical composition to
ABC television, but who retained right to receive royalties, held to have sufficient
beneficial copyright interest to sue).
21. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(2).
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licensee of even a very narrowly defined exclusive right, such as a one-time
exclusive license to perform a play on the stage in New York City, may sue
for infringement of that exclusive right. In contrast, under the prior Act, a
copyright was not considered divisible. A licensee of individual exclusive
rights therefore was not considered a copyright "owner" and could not sue
for infringement unless he joined the licensor as a party to the action.
22
Thus, while the new Copyright Act still does not permit holders of nonexclu-
sive rights under copyright to sue without joining their grantors, the Act has
made it easier for exclusive licensees to initiate copyright actions.
III
COPYRIGHTABILITY
Fact-Based Narrative Works.-Some recent decisions have provoked
much uncertainty concerning the extent of copyright protection accorded to
nonfiction narrative works, particularly histories and biographies. While
such works as a whole are copyrightable, some courts have begun to break
down the works into separate components, and to treat some components as
"facts" that cannot be protected. Thus, in Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation
Enterprises,23 a divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit held that the portions of former President Ford's autobiogra-
phy copied by the defendant magazine must have their uncopyrightable ele-
ments "stripped away" before the court would determine whether defendant's
copying constituted a "fair use." 24 The majority held that the copied mate-
rial concerned historical facts, government documents, statements by persons
other than the author, and the author's states of mind. After dissecting the
autobiography, the court held that, "at most, approximately 300" of almost
2,000 allegedly copied words were copyrightable.25 The majority further held
that the scope of copyright protection for nonfiction, and especially for histor-
ical autobiographical works, would be limited to the author's "ordering and
22. See generally Kaminstein, Divisibility of Copyrights 11-15 (1957), reprinted
in Copyright Law Revision, Studies Prepared for the Subcommittee on Patents,
Trademarks, and Copyrights, Study No. 11 (1960).
23. 723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 2655 (1984).
[Editor's Note: On May 20, 1985 a six-member majority of the Supreme Court
reversed the Second Circuit decision. In an opinion by Justice O'Connor, the Court
held that the defendant's "lifting [of] verbatim quotes of the author's language total-
ling between 300 and 400 words" was not a fair use. 53 U.S.L.W. 4558. 4565 (U.S.
May 20, 1985). In so holding, the Court declined to consider the extent to which a
factual narrative's uncopyrightable and copyrightable elements will combine to form
protected expression, and the limits of permissible appropriation of such work. Id. at
4564.]
24. 723 F.2d at 206.
25. Id.
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choice of the words themselves."'26 The United States Supreme Court heard
arguments in an appeal from the decision on November 6, 1984.27
In another case concerning a biography, Marshal v. Yates,28 the United
States District Court for the Central District of California held that the au-
thor of a biography of movie star Frances Farmer could not claim copyright
protection for allegedly "fictionalized elements" in the biography since these
elements had been recounted in the book as if they were true facts.
29
Compilations of Facts.-Ironically, while narrative fact-based works
have encountered grudging copyright protection from some courts, directo-
ries and compilations of facts featuring no or few narrative aspects have re-
ceived extremely, and perhaps excessively, strong copyright recognition. The
rationale for such protection has often been the compior's labor in gathering
the facts listed in the directory or compilation. In Rand MciVally & Co. v.
Fleet Management Systems, 30 the United States District Court for the North-
ern District of Illinois relied on a prior decision in National Business List;
Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreea InC.,31 to hold that a mileage guide's listing of
distances between certain cities over designated roads would be protectible if
the plaintiff could demonstrate sufficient expenditure of labor in the creation
of its guides.32 Despite the language of the 1976 Copyright Act, which de-
clares compilations protectible if they are "works formed by the collection
and assembling of... data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in
such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of
authorship," 33 the court held that the key to protection is not a compilation's
"arrangement," but the compilor's "industrious collection" in gathering
faCts. 34
By contrast, a unanimous panel of the Court of Appeals for the Second
26. Id. at 204.
27. 104 S. Ct. 2655 (1984). The court of appeals concluded by holding that a
"fair use" of the copyrightable matter had been made. For a discussion of fair use in
the context of Harper & Row, see notes 175-80 infra and accompanying text.
28. 1983 Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) 25,594 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 1983).
29. Accord, Oxford Book Co. v. College Entrance Book Co., 119 F.2d 874 (2d
Cir. 1938); Huie v. NBC. 184 F. Supp. 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). But see, Belcher v.
Tarbox, 486 F.2d 1087, 1088 (9th Cir. 1973) ("There is nothing in the Copyright Act
to suggest that courts are to pass upon the truth or falsity, the soundness or unsound-
ness of the views embodied in a copyright work."); DeAcosta v. Brown, 146 F.2d 408
(2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 862 (1945) (since it is a convention of Hollywood
writing to invent romances, addition of a fabricated love-interest to biography of Clara
Barton does not preclude protection for the author's invented episodes).
30. 591 F. Supp. 726 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
31. 552 F. Supp. 89 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
32. 591 F. Supp. at 733.
33. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
34. 591 F. Supp. at 732-33 & n.4.
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Circuit in Eckes v. Card Prices Update3" apparently rejected the labor ration-
ale for copyright protection of compilations. The Eckes court held that a
price guide for baseball cards was protectible not because the authors had
invested tremendous effort in creating the work, but because the authors' se-
lection of 5,000 "premium" cards from a total of 18,000 baseball cards mani-
fested "subjective selection and arrangement of information" and "creativity
and judgment."'36 The court's decision left unclear whether the plaintiff's
price guide would have been protected had it simply contained a listing of the
18,000 cards without a "subjective" subclassification of 5,000 "premium"
cards.
These two decisions set forth opposite extremes in interpreting the statu-
tory definition of a protectible compilation. The Rand McNally court tied
copyright protection exclusively to the "collection" of data, and ignored the
statutory direction that the data also be "selected, coordinated or ar-
ranged."' 37 The Eckes court, by contrast, may have overemphasized the crite-
ria of "selection" and "arrangement," while neglecting the nonsubjective




Works Made for Hire.-The 1976 Copyright Act continues and codifies,
in modified form, the judge-made limitation on a creator's copyright owner-
ship known as the "work made for hire" doctrine. Section 101 of the statute
provides two distinct categories of "works made for hire." First, an employee
who creates a work in the course of his or her employment is not deemed the
copyright owner. Second, "specially ordered or commissioned" works which
fall into specifically enumerated categories will be deemed "works made for
hire" if a written agreement between the creator and the commissioning party
so states.39 Three decisions during the 1983-84 year have presented impor-
tant interpretations of these statutory provisions.
In Roth v. Pritikin,4° the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held that the 1976 Act's definition of a specially commissioned work
made for hire did not apply to a freelance writer's oral agreement to write
recipes for a cookbook. The agreement had been made in 1977, one year
before the Act's effective date.4 1 Had the court applied the Act retroactively,
the agreement's characterization of the recipes as a work made for hire would
35. 736 F.2d 859 (2d Cir. 1984).
36. Id. at 862-63.
37. 591 F. Supp. at 732-33.
38. 736 F.2d at 862-63.
39. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
40. 710 F.2d 934 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 394 (1983).
41. 710 F.2d at 937.
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have been invalid because the 1976 Act requires such agreements to be in
writing, and because the recipes did not fall into one of the statutorily listed
categories of specially commissioned works made for hire.42
In Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc., 4 3 the same court ruled that
statuettes created in Japan and Taiwan pursuant to the order and directions
of an American plaintiff were works made for hire. Statuettes are not in-
cluded in the enumerated categories of specifically commissioned works
which may be deemed works made for hire under the 1976 Act.44 Thus, the
statuettes could not have been considered works made for hire unless the
Japanese and Taiwanese artists were deemed "employees" of the American
company that commissioned them to do the work. The artists, however, were
not regular employees of the company; they were outside contractors called
in to perform this particular task.4 5 The case thus raised the important ques-
tion whether an independent contractor can be considered an "employee"
under the 1976 Copyright Act.
The court held that the foreign artists could be deemed "employees"
because the commissioning American company had "so controlled and super-
vised in the creation of the particular work... that an employer-employee
relationship exist[ed]." 46 The court based this holding upon cases decided
under the prior Copyright Act, which had held that a commissioning party
who had the "right to direct and supervise" the creation of the work would be
deemed the employer and owner of a work made for hire.47 The court rea-
soned, first, that in defining works made for hire, Congress did not intend to
change the prior understanding of an employment relationship, and second,
that an employment relationship may exist between a commissioning party
and an outside contractor.48 The question, according to the court, is whether
the outside contractor is truly independent, or if his work is under the actual
control and direction of the commissioning party.
49
Similarly, in Town of Clarkstown v. Reeder,50 the United States District
42. Id. at 938. The statute provides that only the following specially commis-
sioned works can qualify as works made for hire: a contribution to a collective work,
a part of a motion picture or audiovisual work, a translation, a supplementary work, a
compilation, an instructional text, a test, answer material for a test, or an atlas. 17
U.S.C. § 101.
43. 738 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1984).
44. See note 42 supra.
45. 738 F.2d at 549-50.
46. Id. at 552; see also id. at 553.
47. See, e.g., Epoch Producing Corp. v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 522 F.2d 737, 744
(2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 955 (1976); Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc.,
457 F.2d 1213, 1216-17 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 977 (1972).
48. 738 F.2d at 552.
49. Id. at 551-53.
50. 566 F. Supp. 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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Court for the Southern District of New York held that a manual prepared
after the effective date of the 1976 Act by a "volunteer employee" of a town
was a work made for hire. As in Aldon Accessories, the work at issue did not
fall into the enumerated categories of specially ordered works which may
constitute a work made for hire. The court in Reeder grounded its determi-
nation on a ruling that the author was an "employee." The court held that an
employment relationship existed despite the writer's status as a volunteer be-
cause the municipality had the "right to direct and supervise the manner in
which the manual was created."
' 51
These two decisions, by relying on the commissioning party's right to
direct and supervise the outside contractor, threaten to blur the statutory dis-
tinction between the works of "employees" and "specially ordered or com-
missioned works." Arguably, in separating these two types of works,
Congress intended that the products of outside contractors would be consid-
ered works made for hire only under narrowly defined circumstances. In
contrast, any work created by an "employee" in the course of employment is
a work made for hire. By redefining certain outside contractors as employees,
these courts may be depriving outside contractors of the copyright ownership
which Congress had intended to secure them. The Aldon Accessories decision,
however, appears to include an important limitation: the existence of a right
to direct and supervise an outside contractor will not give rise to an employ-
ment relationship unless the commissioning party actually and substantially
exercises the right.
Aldon Accessories is also of considerable practical importance for Ameri-
can companies. Many American companies engage outside contractors, par-
ticularly in the Far East, to design and manufacture dolls, toys, and works of
decorative art. This decision seems to confirm that the American company,
and not the foreign manufacturer, is the copyright owner of the resulting
work, at least so long as the commissioning company supervises the creation
of the work.
Vesting initial copyright ownership in the commissioning American
company is of particular significance when the work is created in a country
that either lacks a domestic copyright system (and thus precludes securing an
assignment of copyright from the creator), or is not a signatory to a copyright
treaty with the United States. Under the 1976 Copyright Act, a published
foreign-created work is entitled to U.S. copyright protection if its author is a
citizen or domiciliary of the United States or of a country which is party to a
copyright treaty with the United States. United States copyright protection
also attaches to a work first publicly distributed in the United States or in a
treaty country.52 Since many of the Far Eastern countries in which Ameri-
51. Id. at 141-42.
52. See 17 U.S.C. § 104(b). Unpublished foreign works are protected in the U.S.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Annual Survey of American Law
COPYRIGHT LAW
can companies commission the creation of dolls, toys, decorative artworks,
and similar works, are neither signatories to a bilateral copyright treaty with
the United States, nor to a multilateral copyright treaty to which the United
States is a party,5 3 the resulting works, if published, will not be protected by
copyright in the United States unless the commissioning company is deemed
the "author," or unless the works are first publicly distributed here or in a
treaty country.
Termination of Transfers.-The 1976 Act contains two provisions en-
abling authors to terminate their grants of copyright. For works created after
1978, section 203 permits the author or statutorily designated successors to
terminate the grant thirty-five years after its execution.54 For works created
before 1978, Congress extended the period of copyright protection from fifty-
six to seventy-five years, and provided in section 304(c) that all grants may be
terminated fifty-six years from the date copyright was first secured.55 In pro-
viding for termination of grants of rights under copyright, Congress recog-
nized that a work's value may be undetermined at the time the author grants
such rights, and that authors should be able to share in their works' subse-
quent increase in value.5 6 Congress also stated that authors have a particu-
larly strong claim to regain transferred rights during the "extended renewal"
period accorded to pre-1978 works because the additional nineteen years of
protection afforded by extending the copyright period from fifty-six to sev-
enty-five years ought primarily to benefit the author.
5 7
Both termination provisions also contain an important exception: "A
derivative work prepared under the authority of the grant before its termina-
tion may continue to be utilized under the terms of the grant after its termina-
under all circumstances. Id. § 104(a). U.S. protection will also be accorded if the
president has issued a proclamation extending protection to works published in, or
created by authors from, countries which the president has determined accord U.S.
authors substantially the same copyright protection which the foreign country extends
to its nationals. 17 U.S.C. § 104(b)(4).
53. The major multilateral copyright treaty to which the U.S. is a party is the
Universal Copyright Convention. Japan is a signatory to the Universal Copyright
Convention, but South Korea, Singapore, and the Republic of China (Taiwan) are not.
The U.S. has no other copyright relations with Singapore. A 1908 bilateral copyright
treaty with Japan concerning Korea has since been abrogated. See U.S. Dep't of State,
Treaties in Force 326 n.19 (1984). Since the reopening of diplomatic relations with
the People's Republic of China in 1979, the status of prior bilateral copyright relations
with Taiwan has become unclear. Id. at 323 n.4.
It should be noted that the international copyright repercussions of a finding that
the Taiwanese artists were the "authors" of the statuettes were not briefed in the Al-
don Accessories case.
54. 17 U.S.C. § 203.
55. Id. § 304(c).
56. See H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 124 (1976).
57. Id. at 140.
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tion. ' ' 58 Under this exception, records and tapes embodying a licensed sound
recording of a musical composition, for example, could continue to be re-
leased if the sound recording had been produced pursuant to the now-termi-
nated grant.
A recent Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision, Harry Fox Agency,
Inc. v. Mills Music, 59 addressed a termination issue not explicitly covered by
the derivative works exception to section 304(c); the court resolved the prob-
lem by reference to Congress' intent in affording authors a termination right.
In Mills Music, heirs of a songwriter terminated the original grant of rights to
a music publisher. The music publisher previously had made further grants,
by licensing record companies to make sound recordings of the song.
60
Under the derivative works exception to the termination provision, the record
companies were permitted to continue producing and selling previously re-
corded versions of the song. The question posed in the case was: To whom
do the record companies pay royalties for their continued derivative use of
the song? To the terminated publisher, who had licensed them, or directly to
the composer's heirs?6 1 The appellate court stated that while section 304(c)
did not expressly address the "multiple grant" problem posed in the case, the
general scheme of the 1976 Act termination provisions evidenced an intent to
protect authors of underlying works and creators of derivative works, rather
than publishers and original assignees who merely license creation of deriva-
tive works.62 Thus, the court held that royalties from the record companies
should be paid directly to the composer's heirs.
V
FORMALITIES - NOTICE
The 1976 Act has liberalized the requirement of placing notice on pub-
lished copies of a copyrighted work. While sections 401 and 402 direct that
notice be placed on published copies and phonorecords, section 405 affords
the copyright owner a five-year period in which to cure defects and omissions
of notice in publicly distributed copies.63 Under the prior law, defective or
omitted notice could lead automatically to forfeiture of copyright protection,
and thus could cast the work into the public domain. 64 Several decisions
58. 17 U.S.C. §§ 203(b)(1), 304(c)(6)(A).
59. 720 F.2d 733 (2d Cir. 1983). [Editor's Note: Mills Music has been reversed.
Mills Music v. Snyder, 105 S. Ct. 638 (1985)].
60. Id. at 735
61. Id. at 734-36.
62. Id. at 740-43.
63. 17 U.S.C. §§ 401(a), 402(a), 405(a).
64. See, e.g., Bell v. Combined Registry Co., 188 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 707 (N.D. I1.
1975); Crumb v. A.A. Sales, Inc., 188 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 445 (N.D. Cal. 1975). Both
decisions are discussed in Latman, Copyright Law, 1976 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 629, 640-
41 & nn. 88-92.
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during the 1983-84 year have attempted to clarify a number of uncertainties:
when notice is required, whether an intentionally omitted notice may be
cured; and what steps are adequate to cure an omitted or defective notice.
In Schuchart & Associates v. Solo Serve Corp.,65 the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Western District of Texas held that the omission of notice
from copies of architectural plans that had been distributed to a limited group
of persons did not defeat the plaintiff architect's copyright claim. Since notice
must be placed on "published" or "publicly distributed" copies, the court had
to determine whether publication occurred when the architect distributed
plans to his client, to subcontractors responsible for erecting the building,
and, in accordance with local law, to municipal agencies." The court ruled
that "published" copies under the statute were copies which had been distrib-
uted "to the public," and that plaintiff's distribution of copies in this case had
been made to a limited class of persons for the limited purpose of construct-
ing the building.67 The copies therefore were not "published," and it was not
necessary to affix a copyright notice to them.
In Innovative Concepts in Entertainment, Inc v. Entertainment Enter-
prises Ltd.,68s the plaintiff, an owner of the copyright in a miniature hockey
game, initially had omitted notice because his attorney had advised him that
the game could not be protected under the copyright laws. When subsequent
counsel informed the plaintiff that copyright protection was available, the
plaintiff affixed notice labels to his stock of games and sent labels to his dis-
tributors for affixation.69 In ruling on whether plaintiff's deliberate, albeit
misinformed, omission of notice was curable under section 405, the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York acknowledged but
refused to follow Beacon Looms, Inc. v. S. Lichtenberg & Co.,70 a decision
from the Southern District of New York which had held that section 405
applies only to inadvertent omissions of notice.71 The Beacon Looms court
based its ruling on the language of section 405(a)(2), which provides for a
"reasonable effort" to add notice "after the omission has been discovered."
72
That court held that because only an inadvertent omission could be "discov-
ered," the statute could not have been intended to apply to deliberate
omissions. 73
65. 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 170 (W.D. Tex. 1983).
66. Id. at 179 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101).
67. Id. at 179-80. The court thus imputed to the 1976 Act the concept of "lim-
ited" publication developed under the 1909 Act. See, e.g., Burke v. Natl Broadcast-
ing Co., 598 F.2d 688 (1st Cir. 1979).
68. 576 F. Supp. 457 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
69. Id. at 460.
70. 552 F. Supp. 1305 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
71. 576 F. Supp. at 461-62.
72. 552 F. Supp. at 1310 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 405(a)(2)).
73. Id.
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The Innovative Concepts court nonetheless held that the plaintiff's delib-
erate omission was curable under section 405 because Congress, in providing
an opportunity to cure omissions of notice, "was more solicitous of the actual
intent of the author than of the reliance interests of innocent infringers.
' '74
The court further observed that another provision of section 405 limits the
damages available against an infringer who was innocently misled by plain-
tiff's omission of notice.
75
The court's disposition appears to be supported by the general structure
and intention of the 1976 Act notice provisions. Because "innocent infring-
ers" face a lesser degree of liability,7 6 a holding that only unintentional
omissions may be cured is not necessary to protect the reliance interests of the
innocent infringer. Rather, such a holding would have the effect of com-
pletely invalidating the plaintiff's copyright. The copyright owner thus would
have no recourse against any copier, whether or not the copier knew of plain-
tiff's claim to copyright in the work.
It is doubtful that Congress intended so draconian a result. While per-
mitting the cure of deliberate omissions of notice may appear to undermine
the purpose and theory of the notice requirement, Congress indicated that the
reform in the 1976 Act rendering the notice requirement no longer absolute
"represents a major change in the theoretical framework of American copy-
right law."' 77 Indeed, the House Report accompanying the 1976 Act stated
that the curative provisions of section 405 applied to "omission of notice,
whether intentional or unintentional.
'78
Another provision contained in section 405 has generated litigation call-
ing for interpretation of the requirement that within five years after publica-
tion, the copyright owner make a "reasonable effort" to "add notice to all
copies or phonorecords that are distributed to the public."179 In Shapiro &
Son Bedspread Corp. v. Royal Mills Associates,80 the plaintiff had distributed
over 500,000 bedspreads bearing a defective notice, and did not begin to rem-
edy the defect until four years and eight months after initial distribution of
the goods. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York held that the copyright owner's subsequent affixation of labels bearing a
proper copyright notice to bedspreads in the owner's inventory did not meet
the "reasonable efforts" standard.8 1 The court stated that the copyright
74. 576 F. Supp. at 462.
75. Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 405(b)). Section 405(b) affords the court wide discre-
tion to structure a remedy to accommodate the respective interests of the copyright
owner and the infringer misled by the absence of notice.
76. See 17 U.S.C. § 405(b); see also note 75 supra.
77. H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 146 (1976).
78. Id. at 147.
79. 17 U.S.C. § 405(a)(2).
80. 568 F. Supp. 972 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
81. Id. at 979.
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owner should have endeavored to ensure that labels would also be affixed to
bedspreads that had been distributed to stores before defendant discovered
that the notice was improper, but that had not yet been sold to consumers.8
VI
INFRINGEMENT
Access and Copying.-It is axiomatic that a work is not infringed unless
it has been copied. No matter how similar plaintiff's and defendant's works,
if defendant's work was created independently there can be no copyright in-
fringement. When there is no direct proof that defendant copied, plaintiff
may nonetheless prove that defendant's work was not independently created
by showing that defendant had access to and the opportunity to copy plain-
tiff's work, and that the two works are substantially similar.83 Two recent
decisions have addressed proof of defendant's access where no direct copying
could be shown.
In Selle v. Gibb,84 the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois overturned a jury verdict that the Bee Gees' popular song
"How Deep Is Your Love" infringed the plaintiff's song "Let It End."
Although the songs were similar in many respects, the court held that there
was no credible evidence that the Bee Gees had ever seen or heard plaintiff's
song.8 5 The Bee Gees had written their song in France; the plaintiff's song
had never been published and had been performed only a few times at private
82. Id. at 977-78. In Videotronics, Inc. v. Bend Elec., 586 F. Supp. 478 (D. Nev.
1984), the United States District Court for the District of Nevada held that a video-
game's copyright notice, which flashed on the videogame screen on a random and
infrequent basis, did not meet the requirement of permanent legibility to an ordinary
user of the work under ordinary conditions of use. Id. at 482. The copyright owner
had distributed an earlier version of the game without notice; it then added this defec-
tive notice. The court held that the copyright owner's failure to correct the omission
of notice in the first version until it had introduced a revised version of the game was
not a sufficient effort to correct the omission. Moreover, despite the effort to add a
notice to the revised game, the court held that an effort to add a notice which was
defective is not a curative "reasonable effort." Id. at 483. The court found that the
§ 405 "reasonable effort" standard implies that a copyright owner may have to expend
more time and money to cure an omitted or defective notice than might otherwise be
expended in the normal course of business. Id. at 482-83.
Finally, although the notice placed on the revised game was defective because it
was not permanent, the court dismissed defendant's objections to the form of the no-
tice. While copyright notice usually contains a "C' within a circle, the notice on the
videogame displayed a "C" within a hexagon. Because the computer graphics for the
machine displaying the videogame were incapable of forming a circle, the court held
that the hexagonal shape sufficed. Id. at 481.
83. See Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prod. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d
1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 1977); A. Latman, The Copyright Law, 159-63 (1979).
84. 567 F. Supp. 1173 (N.D. Ill. 1983), aff'd, 741 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1984).
85. 567 F. Supp. at 1181.
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gatherings in the Chicago area.8 6
The district court also rejected the plaintiff's argument that even if the
opportunity of access cannot be proved, access and copying may be inferred
from the "striking similarities" of the songs.8 7 In essence, the plaintiff con-
tended that the songs were so similar that the only explanation for such simi-
larity could be that the defendant copied the plaintiff's song. The court held
that when the undisputed facts negate any finding of access, or even the op-
portunity for access to the plaintiff's song, an inference of access and copying
based on striking or substantial similarity would be neither logical nor
permissible.
88
In affirming the district court decision, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit agreed that striking similarities, or even com-
plete identity, between two works will not support a finding of infringement
unless there is "at least some other evidence which would establish a reason-
able possibility that the complaining work was available to the alleged in-
fringer. .... Thus, although proof of striking similarity may permit an
inference of access, the plaintiff must still meet some minimum threshold of
proof which demonstrates that the inference of access is reasonable." 8 9 The
court affirmned the ruling below that the plaintiff had failed to produce evi-
dence justifying an inference of access. 90
The appellate court then discussed the concept of "striking similarity."
According to the court, striking similarity is a term of art connoting more
than substantial similarity. Striking similarities concern material so unique
or complex that defendant would be most unlikely to have produced the same
material in the same context by coincidence, accident or independent crea-
tion.9 1 Thus, for example, when allegedly copied material is standard to the
medium or derives from a prior common source, the similarities between
plaintiff's and defendant's music will not be deemed "striking.
'"92
Reviewing the evidence produced at trial, the appellate court observed
86. Id. at 1175-77.
87. Id. at 1182.
88. Id. at 1182-83. See also Meta-Film Assocs. v. MCA, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 1346
(C.D. Cal. 1984), in which Universal City Studios, producer of the film "Animal
House," was held not to have had access to an unpublished screenplay about frater-
nity frolics that was sent to a director under contract to Universal. The court found
any links between the director and the writers of the "Animal House" screenplay too
speculative to present a triable issue of access. Id. at 1357. The court noted that
individuals at film studios receive large numbers of unsolicited scripts, and that it is
not reasonable, without some further showing, to attribute the recipient's knowledge
of the unsolicited script to other individuals at the studio. Id.
89. 741 F.2d 896, 901-02 (7th Cir. 1984).
90. Id. at 905-06.
91. Id. at 901.
92. Id.
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that the musical themes that the plaintiff alleged had been copied were them-
selves quite similar to themes in several prior musical works, including a
Beatles song and Beethoven's Fifth Symphony. The court therefore held that
the plaintiff had failed to show that the allegedly copied portions of his work
presented the kind of subject matter upon which a finding of striking similar-
ity could be based.
93
In ABKCO Music, Ina v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd.,94 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's holding
that George Harrison's song "My Sweet Lord" infringed an earlier popular
song, "He's So Fine." The district court had held that Harrison had access
and the opportunity to copy the plaintiff's song because it was a top hit and
widely disseminated in the United States and England during the 1960's when
Harrison would have had ample opportunity to hear it.
95
In Harrisongs, the district court also addressed the issue of "subcon-
scious infringement." Harrison had not knowingly copied "He's So Fine."
Rather, in the process of writing his own song, certain musical refrains came
to mind, which Harrison believed he was composing on the spot, but which in
fact were Harrison's memories of the prior song.96 The district court had
followed precedent in ruling that intent was not an element of an infringe-
ment claim; the test is whether the work has been substantially copied, not
whether the copying was consciously or subconsciously accomplished.
97
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit explicitly
affirmed the holding that subconscious copying amounted to copyright in-
fringement because an intent to infringe is not required under the Copyright
Act.98 Noting the problems of proof that would emerge ff an innocent intent
defense were permitted, the court warned that such a defense "could substan-
tially undermine the protections Congress intended to afford to copyright
holders." 99 The court added, however, that innocent intent, while not affect-
ing the liability question, could be a factor in fashioning a remedy against the
infringer. 1° °
Substantial Similarity.-During the 1983-84 year several decisions have
addressed the issue of what constitutes a similarity of copyrightable expres-
sion sufficiently "substantial" to warrant a finding of infringement. While the
93. Id.
94. 722 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1983).
95. Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177, 179
(S.D.N.Y. 1976).
96. Id. at 178-80.
97. Id. at 181 (citing Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54
(2d Cir. 1936)). See Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145 (C.QS.D.N.Y.
1924)).
98. 722 F.2d at 998.
99. Id. at 999.
100. Id. at 999 n.12.
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works of the plaintiff and defendant may be similar, the question often arises
whether the works are similar because both works are based on the same
general, unprotectible idea or whether the the works are similar because the
defendant substantially copied the plaintiff's particular and protectible ex-
pression of the idea. A further question arises as to whether the idea ex-
pressed in the plaintiff's work permits only a few variations in presentation.
If so, then the resemblance between the plaintiff's and defendant's presenta-
tions of the idea will not be considered in determining whether the works are
substantially similar.
In Mattel, Inc. v. Azrak-Hamway International, Inc.,1O1 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a defendant toy
manufacturer's dolls portraying highly muscled fighting men did not infringe
the plaintiff's heroically built dolls of fighting men. The court found that
most of the similarities between the dolls were due to the common, unpro-
tectible idea of a "superhuman muscleman crouching in .. .a traditional
fighting pose." 10 2 The court then ruled that the defendant's particularized
presentation of the doll's musculature was not substantially similar to
plaintiff's. 
10 3
In Warner Brothers v. American Broadcasting Companies, 104 the same
court held that the fictional character in the television series "The Greatest
American Hero" was not substantially similar to "Superman." The "Ameri-
can Hero" character was an average American male who, against his will,
became endowed with super powers. His attempts to marshal these powers in
service of just causes proved comically inept.' 05 The character, while sug-
gesting a maladroit version of Superman, could be viewed as a satire on the
superhero genre.10 6 The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that a charac-
ter reminiscent of Superman, or whose traits parody Superman's traits, is sub-
stantially similar to Superman. Rather, because of the stark contrasts
between the American Hero and Superman, the court held that the overall
impression of the defendant's character was substantially and calculatedly
101. 724 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1983).
102. Id. at 360.
103. Id. See also Williams Elecs. v. Bally Mfg., 568 F. Supp. 1274 (N.D. Il1.
1983), in which the court granted summary judgment to defendant on a copyright
infringement claim concerning a pinball game. The court identified and removed from
consideration the uncopyrightable elements of plaintiff's game before it would com-
pare the works to determine whether they were substantially similar. Since most of
the similarities between plaintiff's and defendant's pinball games were held to concern
either unprotectible game concepts or pictorial, graphic or sculptural game features
that were "functional" to the game's operation, the court concluded that the defend-
ant's game was not substantially similar to plaintiff's game.
104. 720 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1983).
105. Id. at 236-38.
106. Id. at 243.
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dissimilar. 107
Applying the overall impression test, the court rejected the defendant's
attempt to analyze each character trait common to Superman and the Ameri-
can Hero, and to dismiss each trait as an unprotected idea. Such an ap-
proach, the court stated, overlooks the "aggregation of particular talents and
traits" selected for the plaintiff's character, while each talent or trait sepa-
rately may be an unprotected idea, in combination they yield a protected
work.1 0 8 Here, however, the characters were held to be too dissimilar to per-
mit a finding of copyright infringement.
In Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players,109 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected an infringement claim
brought by the author of a strategy manual for the boardgame Scrabble.
Although the defendant's Scrabble handbook copied the plaintiff's ideas and
recommendations, 110 the court held that the similarities in the works were
unavoidable; the plaintiff's unprotectible ideas allowed for little variation in
expression.1 11 The court then ruled that the defendant did not "duplicate the
selection, coordination and arrangement of the ideas" in the plaintiff's work,
and defendant's work did not amount to a "wholesale appropriation" of the
plaintiff's manual.
112
The "wholesale appropriation" standard of infringement is a recent de-
velopment in U.S. copyright law, and has been applied in the context of cer-
tain nonfiction works.1 1 3 Under this standard, it appears that a defendant
may permissibly copy more from a nonfiction work than from a work of fic-
tion.114 The "wholesale appropriation" standard of infringement for nonfic-
107. Id. at 239-43. The court stated, "In the genre of superheros, [the American
Hero] follows Superman as, in the genre of detectives, Inspector Clouseau follows
Sherlock Holmes." Id. at 243.
108. Id. at 243.
109. 736 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1984).
110. The district court, in upholding the plaintiff's claim, found that the defend-
ant engaged in wholesale copying of the plaintiff's work. Although the defendant did
not use verbatim portions of the plaintiff's work, it paraphrased significant portions.
Id. at 487.
111. Id. at 489.
112. Id.
113. See, e.g., Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980) (historical information not protected by copyright law).
114. While the meaning of "wholesale appropriation" does not emerge clearly
from the decisions which resort to the rubric, the standard may be so stringent as to
condition a ruling of infringement of a nonfiction narrative work upon a showing that
the work, or significant portions of it, has been copied virtually verbatim. See, e~g.,
Hoehling, 618 F.2d at 979-80 (appearing to equate "wholesale appropriation" with a
"virtual identity" between plaintiff's and defendant's works). This elevated standard
appears to rest on the dubious premise that according a lesser degree of protection to
nonfiction authors will promote access to factual and historical information.
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tion works has encountered considerable criticism, and it is not clear whether
the standard will gain general judicial acceptance.1 15
Public Performance.-The 1976 Act, like its predecessor, grants copy-
right owners the exclusive right to perform their works publicly.1 16 Unlike
the prior Act, the 1976 Act defines a public performance. Section 101 sets
forth two alternative definitions of a "public" performance. First, a public
performance occurs "at a place open to the public or at any place where a
substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its
social acquaintances is gathered." 117 Second, a public performance will also
result if the work is transmitted or otherwise communicated "by means of
any device or process, whether the members of the public capable of receiving
the performance. receive it in the same place or in separate places and at
the same time or at different times." 118 Both aspects of this definition were
tested in Columbia Pictures Industries v. Redd Home Inc. 119
In Redd Home, the defendant operated a video store which housed sev-
eral "screening rooms." Customers rented videocassettes of motion pictures
and viewed them in these screening rooms. 120 The store was open to the
general public but permitted a maximum of only four family members or
social acquaintances in each screening room at a time. A store employee
would handle the equipment that played the cassettes and displayed the au-
diovisual works on the television screens in the screening rooms.12 1 The de-
fendant contended that its screening of videocassettes to four-person groups
of families or social acquaintances was not a "public" performance under the
terms of the statute.
122
The court ruled that the defendant's operations were public perform-
ances under both clauses of the statutory definition. Under the first clause,
the court found that the screening rooms were open to members of the public
just as conventional movie theaters are. Although few people attended each
performance, the court noted that "the potential exists for a substantial por-
tion of the public to attend such performances over a period of time."' 123 In
addition, the repeated playings of the same films to different members of the
public were found to fall under the definition's second clause, because they
communicated the films, by a means or device (here a videocassette player) to
115. See, e.g., Ginsburg, Sabotaging and Reconstructing History: A Comment
on the Scope of Copyright Protection in Works of History After Hoehling v. Univer-
sal City Studios, 29 J. Copyright Soc'y 647 (1982).
116. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4).
117. Id. § 101.
118. Id.
119. 568 F. Supp. 494 (W.D. Pa. 1983), aff'd, 749 F.2d 154 (3d Cir. 1984).
120. 568 F. Supp. at 496-97.
121. Id. at 497.
122. Id. at 499-500.
123. Id. at 500.
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members of the public in the same place at different times.124
The decision represents a small victory for the United States motion pic-
ture industry. While the Copyright Act does not accord copyright owners
control over a store's rentals of motion picture videocassettes to home viewers
once the videocassettes have been sold to the store,12 this decision estab-
lishes that the motion picture copyright owners may prevent a store from
renting films to customers for in-store viewing. Bills are currently pending in
Congress to afford motion picture copyright owners a "rental right" applica-
ble after initial sale of copies of motion pictures.
126
Importation.-Section 602 of the 1976 Act empowers copyright owners
to prevent the importation of infringing articles. Section 602 also enables
copyright owners to prevent the importation of copies or phonorecords that
were lawfully manufactured in a foreign country, but are imported into the
United States for distribution without the copyright owner's consent. 127 The
decision in Columbia Broadcasting System v. Scorpio Music Distributors'28
confirms the right of the U.S. copyright owners to prevent the importation of
copies or phonorecords lawfully made abroad.
The strengthening U.S. dollar prompted defendant's activities in Scorpio
Music. As the dollar enjoyed greater buying power abroad, it became more
expensive to purchase certain domestically manufactured records in the
United States than to purchase the same records abroad and import them.
As a result, several U.S. record distributors purchased phonorecords from
foreign manufacturers who had been licensed to manufacture and sell the
records in foreign countries only. In Scorpio Music, the owner of the U.S.
copyrights in the phonorecords at issue brought an action against one of these
distributors, alleging that the records were unlawfully imported into the
United States. 129
The defendant claimed that the U.S. copyright owner could not prevent
the importation because the 1976 Act entitles the owner of lawfully made
copies to sell those copies without the permission of the copyright owner.
130
The court rejected this argument for two reasons. First, under the provision
124. Id. at 500-01.
125. Under § 109(a) of the Act, once the copyright owner has transferred owner-
ship of copies of a work, the owners of lawfully made copies are entitled to sell or
otherwise dispose of them. See also H.IL Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 79
(1976).
126. See note 1 supra.
127. 17 U.S.C. § 602(a).
128. 569 F. Supp. 47 (E.D. Pa. 1983), aff'd mem., No. 83-1688 (3d Cir. June 21,
1984).
129. 569 F. Supp. at 47.
130. Id. at 49. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a), which states that "the owner of a particu-
lar copy... lawfully made under this title... is entitled, without the authority of
the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy."
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relied upon by the defendant, the copies must be lawfully made under the
U.S. Copyright Act. The Act governs only those activities transpiring in the
United States; copies lawfully made in foreign countries are produced under
the authority of foreign copyright law.'
3 '
Second, the court held that the structure and history of the 1976 Act's
import prohibition evidenced a clear congressional intent to supersede the
right of the owner of lawfully made copies to sell those copies. Any other
reading would render meaningless the statute's explicit grant of authority to
prevent the importation of copies, a grant of authority which does not distin-
guish between lawfully and unlawfully produced foreign copies.
13 2
Computer technology has spawned another kind of importation prob-
lem. The personal computer boom has brought with it a number of foreign-
manufactured "knock-off" computers, equipped with infringing copies of
copyrighted programs. The United States Customs Service, at the direction
of U.S. copyright owners, however, will prevent the importation of personal
computers containing infringing programs wired into the circuitry. 133 In ad-
dition, Customs may detain and confiscate such computers.' 3 4 In order to
avoid these obstacles, enterprising pirates began importing "ROM-less com-
puters"-that is, computers without programs wired into the circuitry. Once
the computers entered the United States, the importer would add the infring-
ing programs to the circuitry. A U.S. owner of copyrights in computer pro-
grams recently attempted to curtail this practice by bringing actions before
the U.S. Customs Service and before the U.S. International Trade Commis-
sion. The two actions yielded different results.
The Customs Service13 5 ruled that it did not have authority to prevent
the importation of ROM-less computers. Observing that its regulations ex-
tended only to the exclusion of "piratical copies" 136 of copyrighted works,
the Customs Service found that the ROM-less computers contained no copies
of the plaintiff's computer programs upon entering the United States and
therefore could not be deemed "copies."
137
By contrast, in In re Certain Personal Computers and Components
131. 569 F. Supp. at 49.
132. Id. at 49-50. The court noted that, if it allowed the defendant's claim, a
U.S. importer could circumvent the import prohibition by purchasing the copies indi-
rectly from a foreign manufacturer. Id.
133. See 19 C.F.R. §§ 133.42-.43 (1983).
134. Id. § 133.42.
135. In re Apple Computer, Inc., 28 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 75
(U.S. Customs Serv. March 30, 1984).
136. See 19 C.F.R. § 133.42(a) (1983), which states: "Piratical copies are actual
copies or substantial copies of a recorded copyrighted work, produced and imported
in contravention of the rights of the copyright owner."
137. 28 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. at 76.
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Thereof,138 the same plaintiff succeeded in its claim that the importation of
ROM-less computers violated section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930.139 This
section permits the International Trade Commission ("ITC") to issue orders,
including exclusion orders, to remedy "unfair methods of competition and
unfair acts in the importation of articles into the United States.' t 4 Because
the defendants inserted infringing copies of the plaintiff's programs into the
computers after importation, the ITC held the importation of ROM-less com-
puters a step in the direct infringement of the copyright owner's reproauction
and distribution rights.14 1 The ITC also found that importation of ROM-less
computers constituted contributory infringement because only the plaintiff's
programs would cause the computer to work, and because computers without
programs wired to the circuitry were not capable of a commercially signifi-
cant noninfringing use.142
The ITC decision produced an exclusion order directing Customs to pre-
vent the entry of all ROM-less computers destined to be equipped with copies
of the plaintiff's programs. The order, however, did not authorize Customs to
detain and destroy the computers. 143 By contrast, had the computer program
owner prevailed in its action before the Customs Service, the Customs Service
determination would not only have prevented entry of the ROM-less com-
puters, but also would have provided for their detention and destruction. 144
As a practical matter, however, enforcement of a favorable ruling from the
Customs Service would have required constant monitoring by the copyright
owner. Because the ITC decision will be enforced directly by the Customs
Service, the copyright owner's victory before the ITC is of greater conse-
quence than its loss before the Customs Service.
Contributory Infringement.-In the United States Supreme Court's first
copyright decision since adoption of the 1976 Copyright Act, Sony Corpora-
tion of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 145 a five-member majority
ruled that the manufacturers and distributors of home-use video tape record-
ers ("VTRs") did not contributorily infringe the copyrights in material
broadcast over the public airwaves and recorded by VTR owners. The Court
first asserted that contributory infringement is more easily established when a
defendant provides a potential infringer with the copyrighted work itself
rather than merely providing "the 'means' to accomplish an infringing activ-
138. 1984 Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) 25,651 (I.T.C. Investigation No. 337-TA-
140 March 9, 1984).
139. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1982).
140. Id.
141. 1984 Copyright L. Rep. at 18,930.
142. Id. For a discussion of contributory infringement, see notes 145-52 infra
and accompanying text.
143. 1984 Copyright L. Rep. at 18,938.
144. See 19 C.F.R. §§ 133.42(c), 133.43 (1983).
145. 104 S. Ct. 774 (1984).
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ity."'1 46 The VTR was found to be a mere means to infringe. 147 The Court
added that the defendants were not in a position to control the use of copy-
righted materials by others.
148
The Court next held that no precedent supported a finding of contribu-
tory infringement when a defendant sold equipment with constructive knowl-
edge that its customers might use the equipment to infringe copyrighted
works.14 9 Instead, adopting the "staple article of commerce" rule from the
United States Patent Code,1 50 the Court held that the VTR's ability to be
used to commit copyright infringement did not render the defendants liable
for contributory infringement so long as the product was "merely capable of
substantial noninfringing uses." 51 The Court's language thus suggests that if
an article is "merely capable of substantial noninfringing uses," its manufac-
ture and distribution would not constitute contributory infringement, even if
the article were primarily put to infringing uses.
It should be emphasized, however, that the Court confined its holding to
the context of noncommercial copying of programs freely broadcast over the
public airwaves. The case did not present, and the Court did not address,
questions involving use of a VTR to copy programs broadcast over pay-cable





The fair use exception to copyright infringement, codified at 17 U.S.C.
section 107, excuses prima facie infringements under certain circumstances.
These circumstances include a use that is reasonable, that advances the public
interest, and that does not pose a substantial threat to the copyright owner's
146. Id. at 785-86 (citing Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911)).
147. Id. at 786.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 787.
150. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (1982).
151. 104 S. Ct. at 789. The Court's holding derived from its balancing between
"a copyright holder's legitimate demand for effective-not merely symbolic-protec-
tion of the statutory monopoly, and the rights of others freely to engage in substan-
tially unrelated areas of commerce." Id.
152. Id. at 780, 792. Another contributory infringement case decided in 1983,
before the Supreme Court announced its Sony decision, was Atari, Inc. v. J.S. & A.
Group, Inc., 1983 Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) 25,613 (N.D. Ill. 1983), in which the
district court held the manufacturers of a machine called the "Prom Blaster" contrib-
utory infringers. The Prom Blaster makes duplicate copies of video games for use
with home television sets. After holding that the duplicate copies were not nonin-
fringing "archival" copies under 17 U.S.C. § 117, the court held that the Prom Blaster
was not capable of a substantial noninfringing use. Id.
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actual or potential economic interests.153 In Sony, a sharply divided Supreme
Court held that use of VTRs for "time shifting" copyrighted television pro-
grams broadcast over the public airwaves constituted a fair use.1s4 Justice
Stevens' majority opinion stated that noncommercial private home use of
VTRs, which enhanced public access to programs freely transmitted by tele-
vision broadcasters, was a significant factor favoring fair use.155 Although a
use that involves the copying of an entire work is generally not considered
"fair and reasonable," the Court held that the complete copying of television
programs for later viewing and subsequent erasure did not prevent a finding
of fair use.15 6 The Court also rejected, in the context of time shifting, the
argument that a use cannot be "fair" unless it is a "productive use."15 7 A
productive use involves copying for the purpose of incorporating the copied
material into an independent work, such as a work of criticism or scholar-
ship.15 8 Finally, the Court held that the owners of copyrighted television
programs had failed to demonstrate a likelihood of more than minimal eco-
nomic harm as a result of time shifting.'
59
Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Marshall, Pow-
ell and Rehnquist, treated the fair use issue at considerably greater length
than did the majority opinion. Reviewing the Copyright Act, its legislative
history, and the case law construing the fair use defense, the dissenters vigor-
ously asserted that a nonproductive use which simply enhanced user conven-
153. 17 U.S.C. § 107 provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copyrighted
work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any
other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment,
news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholar-
ship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether
the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be
considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copy-
righted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copy-
righted work.
154. 104 S. Ct. at 789. "Time shifting" was defined by the Court as "the practice
of recording a program to view it once at a later time, and thereafter erasing it." Id. at
779.
155. Id. at 792. Joining Justice Stevens were Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Brennan, White and O'Connor.
156. Id. at 792-93.
157. Id. at 793 n.33, 795 n.40.
158. See, e.g., Seltzer, Exemptions and Fair Use in Copyright: The "Exclusive
Rights" Tensions in the New Copyright Act, 24 Bull. Copyright Soey 215, 237
(1977).
159. 104 S. Ct. at 793-96.
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ience could not be considered "fair."' 16 Unlike the majority, the dissent'
emphasized the ability of the VTR to be used not only for time shifting, but
also for "library-building," the creation and retention of program copies for
the purpose of repeated viewing.
161
The dissenters also disagreed with the majority's evaluation of the ad-
verse economic impact which VTRs might have upon copyrighted works. 162
First, the dissent maintained that VTR recording could damage the copyright
owners' economic interests by reducing their ability to market their works in
movie theaters, on television, and in the sale of videotapes. In addition, the
VTR viewers' avoidance of commercials could decrease advertising reve-
nue.163 Second, the dissenters disagreed with the majority as to who might
exploit the new use market created by the VTR. While the majority indicated
that when new technology opens up new avenues of exploitation of copy-
righted works, those avenues should remain free of the copyright owner's
control, 164 the dissenters asserted that a new use market created by new
technology should come within the copyright owner's domain. 165 Thus, ac-
cording to the dissent, the key issue is not whether VTRs impair the copy-
right owner's ability to be compensated for the original broadcast use of
television programs, but whether VTR manufacturers should be allowed to
deny copyright owners compensation for access to their programs at other
times. 166
The Sony case was the third fair use controversy to reach the Supreme
Court since 1958, and the first to arise under the new Copyright Act. The
first two cases, Benny v. Loew's, Inc.,167 and Williams & Wilkins Co. v.
United States,168 yielded no decision because the eight-member Court-one
Justice being absent in each case-split evenly. The Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Sony, therefore, was much anticipated and was preceded by an ex-
traordinary amount of commentary weighing the various aspects of the fair
use issue. 
169
160. Id. at 807-09.
161. Id. at 797, 810.
162. Id. at 810-11.
163. Id. at 810.
164. Id. at 783-84. Cf. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151,
156 (1975) (when new technology renders the terms of the Copyright Act "ambigu-
ous," the Act should be interpreted against the copyright owner).
165. 104 S. Ct. at 815-16.
166. Id. at 811.
167. 356 U.S. 43 (1958).
168. 420 U.S. 376 (1975).
169. See, e.g., Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic
Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1600 (1982);
Leaffer, The Betamax Case: Another Compulsory License in Copyright Law, 13 U.
Tol. L. Rev. 651 (1982); Comment, The Home Videotaping Controversy: Fair Use or
Fair Game?, 49 Brooklyn L. Rev. 363 (1983); Comment, Betamax Battle: Round
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The scantiness of the majority's discussion of fair use has left lower
courts, copyright owners, and users with many unanswered questions about
the contours of the fair use doctrine. The Supreme Court's eventual decision
in Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enterprises,170 which was argued on
November 6, 1984, may provide some of the guidance lacking in the Sony
decision.
Some considerations extraneous to the fair use doctrine may explain the
Supreme Court's result in Sony.17 ' The first of these considerations is the
identity of the Sony defendants, which presented a novel problem in copy-
right litigation. For the first time, copyright owners sued the manufacturers
and distributors, rather than the users, of a new copying device. Since suing
noncollusive home user defendants could have raised privacy problems, the
plaintiffs' choice of defendants may have been inevitable. Nonetheless, suing
the manufacturers cast plaintiffs in the undesirable role of enemies of new
technology.
The privacy problem, however, was inescapable, and the personal home
use aspect of the copying involved in Sony furnished a second novel consider-
ation. Sony was the first copyright case to involve activities performed regu-
larly in millions of American homes. The majority's opinion indicates a
judicial discomfort with denominating private home activities copyright
infringements.
This factor points to a further consideration, which some have labeled
the enforcement problem. The problem, however, is not really the spectre of
the "copyright police" storming millions of homes, but rather is a question of
congressional intent. A finding of liability on the private home use issue
would have meant that millions of Americans were committing copyright in-
fringement every day. The majority, finding no express congressional discus-
sion of home use, would not attribute to Congress an intent to brand millions
of Americans as copyright infringers. Moreover, since a finding of liability
could result in halting distribution of a popular new device, or entangle the
courts in fashioning a blank tape or VTR equipment royalty scheme, which
Congress had thus far failed to enact, it may not be surprising that the Court
endeavored to find no liability. Thus, it may not have been the Court's fair
use analysis, but the combination of manufacturer-defendants and private
home use which ultimately proved fatal to the copyright owners' claim.
Three, 34 Fed. Communications L. Rev. 291 (1982); Note, The Threatened Future of
Home Video Recorders-Universal City Studios v. Sony, 31 DePaul L Rev. 643
(1982).
170. 723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 2655 (1984). See notes
23-26 supra and accompanying text.
[Editor's Note: Harper & Row has since been reversed. See note 23 supra.]
171. The following discussion is based on Latman & Ginsburg, The Fair Use
Doctrine After Betamax, N.Y.LJ., March 30, 1984, at 1, col 1.
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In Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. General Signal Corp.,172 a
panel of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that a defendant's brief
verbatim quotations taken from the magazine Consumer Reports and used in
the defendant's television advertisements for a vacuum cleaner was a fair use.
Consumer Reports is a magazine which evaluates consumer products and is
not affiliated with any product manufacturer. The magazine claimed that the
defendant's use of quotations from the magazine's evaluation of its product
was unfair because the use in a commercial advertisement endangered the
magazine's reputation as an impartial evaluator of products. 173 The court
found the defendant's first amendment interests in commercial speech a prin-
cipal factor in declaring the use to be fair. 174 In a strongly worded opinion
dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc, Judge Oakes declared that
the fair use defense rarely applied to outright commercial purposes, and that
the court's reliance on the commercial speech theory distorted both the copy-
right law and the first amendment right of free speech.
175
In Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enterprises,17 6 a divided panel of
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that a magazine's copying of por-
tions of former President Ford's unpublished autobiography, without added
independent commentary or criticism, was a fair use.177 The majority thus
rejected the plaintiffs' argument that fair use requires an independent contri-
bution.178 Harper & Row also was the first case under the 1976 Act involving
the application of the fair use doctrine to an unpublished work. 179 Although
the district court had held that the work's unpublished status militated
172. 724 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1983), reh'g denied, 730 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 100 (1984).
173. 742 F.2d at 1050.
174. 734 F.2d at 1049.
175. 730 F.2d at 48, 50.
176. 723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 2655 (1984). For a
discussion of the Harper & Row court's holding on the copyrightability of the Ford
memoirs, see notes 23-26 supra and accompanying text. [Editor's Note: The Supreme
Court recently has reversed the Harper & Row decision. See note 23 supra.]
177. 723 F.2d at 208.
178. Id. at 207.
179. Prior to the 1976 Act, unpublished works were governed by state common
law of copyright. At common law, the author enjoyed the exclusive right of first
publication of his or her work. See, e.g., Atlas Mfg. Co. v. Street & Smith, 204 F. 398,
402 (8th Cir.), appeal dismissed, 231 U.S. 348 (1913). The common law did not rcc-
ognize a fair use defense to interference with the right of first publication. See, e.g.,
Stanley v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 35 Cal.2d 653, 661, 221 P.2d 73, 78 (1950).
See generally Latman, Fair Use of Copyrighted Works, Copyright Law Revision:
Studies Prepared for the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights,
Study No. 14 (1960).
The 1976 Act now governs unpublished as well as published works. See 17
U.S.C. §301(a). Although the Act also has codified the fair use defense, see § 107,
Congress has indicated that the fair use codification was not intended to enlarge the
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against a finding of fair use,18° the majority failed to address the question. In
dissent, Judge Meskill emphasized that the defendant had advanced no public
purpose by its copying; it had made no independent contribution to the work;
and had knowingly invaded the plaintiffs' market for serializing the memoirs
which were soon to be published. 8 1
Defendant's independent contribution, or lack of it, had weighed heavily
in several prior fair use decisions. 182 It remains to be seen, however, whether
the Supreme Court's declaration in Sony that fair use does not require an
independent contribution when the use is private and noncommercial will be
extended to a use which is both public and commercial.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals' Harper & Row and Consumers
Union decisions also call into question the significance to the fair use analysis
of defendant's commercial purpose. In Harper & Row, the court declared
defendant's commercial purpose irrelevant, and in Consumers Union the
court asserted that defendant's commercial use may be protected by the first
amendment.183 These two decisions, however, preceded the Supreme Court's
pronouncement in Sony that a commercial purpose is "presumptively un-
defense beyond its extant judicial elaboration. See H.L Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 66 (1976).
Harper & Row thus raised the question, left unaddressed by the majority,
whether the 1976 Act's fair use provision should be interpreted to incorporate the
prior common law rejection of a fair use defense to the copying of unpublished works.
This issue has received much attention in the amicus briefs submitted to the Supreme
Court by the Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts and the American Association of Pub-
lishers.
It is worth noting that one of the two leading international copyright treaties, the
Berne Convention, article 10, includes a provision permitting the unlicensed use of
short quotations of protected works for purposes analogous to fair use purposes, but
limits this permission to works which have "already, and legitimately, been rendered
accessible to the public." Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artis-
tic Works, reprinted in 3 UNESCO Copyright Laws and Treaties of the World, Item
H-1 at 5 (1979-80). (The United States is not a member of the Berne Convention.)
See also, France, law of March 11, 1957, article 41 (exceptions to copyright owner's
exclusive rights, including fair use-type exceptions, apply only to works previously
publicly disclosed by author).
180. 557 F. Supp. 1067, 1072 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
181. 723 F.2d at 215-17.
182. See, e.g., Wainwright Securities, Inc. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558
F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1977) (defendant's copying of plaintift's stock market reports in crea-
tion of defendant's reports held not a fair use because, inter alia, defendant's reports
were no more than a condensation of plaintifl's reports), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013
(1978); New York Times Co. v. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 217
(D.NJ. 1977) (defendant's substantial investment of labor in creating unauthorized
"Personal Name Index to the New York Times Index" led, among other considera-
tions, to a finding of fair use).
183. Harper & Row, 723 F.2d at 207-08; Consumers Union, 724 F.2d at 1049.
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fair."184 In a decision subsequent to Sony, Financial Information, Inc. v.
Moody's Investors Service Inc.,185 the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit followed the Supreme Court's declaration in holding that defendant's
commercial copying of plaintiff's index cards bearing municipal bond infor-
mation was not a fair use.1
8 6
The Financial Information opinion offers a further contrast to Harper &
Row. In Harper & Row, the majority perceived a substantial public benefit in
information-conveying uses of fact-based copyrighted works, and accordingly
granted wide leeway to defendant's copying.18 7 In Financial Information,
however, defendant's assertion that its use enhanced access to information
met with far less indulgence. The Financial Information court rejected de-
fendant's claim that its copying of a fact-based work constituted a "public
function" exonerated by the fair use doctrine. The court observed that the
elevation of unauthorized copying of an informative work to the status of a
"public function" would distort the fair use factor addressing "the nature and
purpose of defendant's work."'
18 8
184. 104 S. Ct. at 793.
185. 751 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1984).
186. The court remanded for determination of the copyrightability of plaintiff's
index cards.
187. 723 F.2d at 205.
188. 751 F.2d at 508-10. In Association of American Medical Colleges v. Mikae-
lian, 571 F. Supp. 144 (E.D. Pa. 1983), aff'd, 734 F.2d 3 (3d Cir. 1984), the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania rejected the fair use
defense of a defendant who offered a test preparation course to students preparing for
the medical schools admissions examination. Having taken the examination several
times, the defendant allegedly copied many exam questions and included them in test
preparation materials distributed to students who enrolled in his course. Id. at 146-
48. The defendant claimed that the examination questions were not copyrightable
because they contained scientific facts, which are in the public domain. Id. at 151.
The defendant also claimed that he was engaged in a teaching enterprise and that use
of the examination questions was therefore a fair use. Id. at 151-52. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 107.
The court initially held the test questions to be copyrightable because the ques-
tions, although relating to scientific facts, were the prqduct of creative effort. 571 F.
Supp. at 149. The court next ruled that the defendant was not engaged in the kind of
"teaching" that the fair use exemption contemplated. Disclosing confidential test
questions and answers to paying enrollees was found neither to serve a legitimate edu-
cational purpose nor to constitute free public dissemination of information. Id. at 153.
In addition, the court observed that defendant's use would adversely affect the market
for and value of the plaintiff's tests, since disclosure of confidential test questions un-
dermines the test's utility in evaluating the scientific knowledge and reasoning power
of the test taker. Id. at 151-53.




The United States Copyright Act of 1976 is the exclusive law governing
rights of reproduction, derivative works creation, distribution, and public per-
formance and display of works within the subject matter of copyright. The
Act preempts state laws that address the subject matter of copyright and that
grant rights "equivalent to" the exclusive rights granted by federal copyright
law.189 However, the Act preserves state laws that do not address the subject
matter of copyright or do not afford equivalent rights. 190 In applying the
Act's preemption section, therefore, courts must resolve whether a particular
state law addresses the subject matter of copyright, and whether the state law
provides a right equivalent to the rights afforded by the Copyright Act.
In Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enterprises,19 1 the plaintiffs
claimed that the defendant magazine had violated state conversion law by
illegally acquiring possession of former President Ford's unpublished manu-
script and had tortiously interfered with the plaintiffs' publishing contract.
92z
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit first found that
the manuscript as a whole was a work within the subject matter of copyright,
and the act of publication was an exclusive right under copyright. 193 The
court then held that the state claims in essence concerned defendants' unau-
thorized publication of portions of the manuscript, and therefore addressed
rights equivalent to the exclusive federal right of publication.194 The court
further held that to the extent that the state law claims may have concerned
defendants' copying of uncopyrightable material from the manuscript, the
claims were still preempted. Although individual elements of the manuscript
may not have come within the subject matter of copyright, the manuscript as
a whole presented a copyrightable work. 19 5
In Smith v. Weinstein,1 96 a writer charged that defendants, authors and
producers of the film "Stir Crazy," had violated state unfair competition law
by copying plaintiff's screenplay. The court held the screenplay a protected
work, and the right to prevent its copying an exclusive right under copyright,
and therefore dismissed the unfair competition claim on grounds of
189. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a).
190. Id. § 301(b)(1), (3).
191. 723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 2655 (1984). For
discussions of other issues in this case, see notes 23-26 and 175-78 supra and accompa-
nying text. [Editor's note: The Supreme Court recently has reversed the Harper &
Rowe decision. See note 23 supra.]
192. 723 F.2d at 201.
193. Id. at 203.
194. Id. at 201.
195. Id. at 206.
196. 578 F. Supp. 1297 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
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preemption. 197
Plaintiff advanced other state claims, however, which the court declined
to hold preempted. Plaintiff had alleged that when he disclosed the idea of
the screenplay and showed the screenplay to defendants, his disclosures were
subject to an implied contract that defendants would not use plaintiff's mate-
rial unless they paid him for it. 198 The court held that parties may contract
to pay for ideas, even though ideas are not copyrightable. 199 Moreover, the
state contract claim, albeit arising out of alleged copying of portions of a
copyrighted work, does not concern rights "equivalent" to rights under copy-
right. Rather, ruled the court, the claim addressed the personal or business
relationship between the parties to the contract. Similarly, plaintiff's claim of
breach of a confidential relationship does not impinge on copyright princi-
ples, the court held, because enforcement of a state right arising out of such a
relationship affords no rights against third parties: the claim cannot grant
plaintiff a monopoly in his ideas; it arises solely out of the nature of plaintiffs
relationship with defendant.
2 ° °
In Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc.,201 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the defendants had
not infringed the plaintiff's copyright in a Scrabble players' manual, but re-
manded the case to the district court to determine whether the defendants
had violated an implied contract with the plaintiff.20 2 In requesting permis-
sion to use the word "Scrabble," the plaintiff had submitted a manuscript of
his manual to the defendants, owners of the "Scrabble" trademark. The de-
fendants allegedly entered into negotiations with the plaintiff for rights to his
work as a delaying tactic while they prepared their own manual, using plain-
tiff's manuscript as a guide.20 3 The appellate court held that these facts may
be sufficient to establish an implied contract binding the defendants to pay for
the plaintiff's ideas should they be used.
2"4
According to both Landsberg and Weinstein, the Copyright Act of 1976
does not preempt a claim based on the breach of an implied contract to pub-
lish a plaintiff's work, or at least to pay a plaintiff for the disclosure of his
work. These holdings afford important interpretations of the meaning of non-
preempted "legal or equitable rights which are not equivalent to any of the
exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright. ' 20 5 While a state con-




201. 736 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1984).
202. Id. at 490.
203. Id. at 486-87.
204. Id. at 489-90.
205. 17 U.S.C. § 301(b)(3).
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tract claim and a copyright claim may both arise out of defendant's copying
of plaintiff's work, and may subject defendant to similar liability, these cases
indicate that the equivalence of result does not necessarily render the state
right itself equivalent to a right under copyright. Rather, the test appears to
focus both on the nature of the defendant's conduct and on the interests af-
fected by that conduct. The state-based rights arising from a confidential re-
lationship or implied contract are qualitatively different from the rights
granted by copyright.20 6 Copyright protects authors against the copying of
their works; it does not regulate the personal relationship or business ethics of
parties to a confidential agreement or implied contract. The states have a
valid interest in securing compliance with laws that command fair dealing.
Enforcement of that state interest does not interfere with the federal interest
in assuring a uniform national law proscribing copying of copyrighted works.
As the Weinstein court observed, state law affords the plaintiff protection
against only the other party to the agreement; it grants the plaintiff no rights
against nonparty copiers.
20 7
The preservation of state law rights governing confidential relationships
and implied contracts is particularly significant when, as in Weinstein and
Landsberg, the defendant's copying does not amount to copyright infringe-
ment. When the defendant has copied only the plaintiff's idea or other
noncopyrightable material, the plaintiff's copyright claim will fail. If a state
law claim concerning breach of a confidential relationship or an implied con-
tract is deemed preempted on the ground that it would achieve the same re-
sult as the disallowed copyright claim, no applicable law would deter
defendants from the kind of unfair and unethical conduct alleged in the
Scrabble case. Such a consequence would advance no federal interest and
would thwart state interests in preventing such conduct'0 8 Preservation of
206. Cf. Werlin v. Readers Digest Assoc., 528 F. Supp. 451,467 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(citing Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enter., 501 F. Supp. 848, 852 (S.D.N.Y.
1980), rev'd on other grounds, 723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct.
2655 (1984)) (applying the "qualitatively different" rights test to hold a claim for un-
just enrichment not preempted).
207. 578 F. Supp. at 1307. See note 199 supra and accompanying text.
208. Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Local 25, 430 U.S.
290, 296-97 (1977) (when state claim seeks to remedy an invasion of rights beyond the
ambit of federal statutory policy, and the rights the state claim asserts are "deeply
rooted in local feeling and responsibility," state claim should be preserved). See gener-
ally, Gorman, Fact or Fancy: The Implications for Copyright, 29 1. Copyright Soce'y
560, 608-07 (1982).
Three other preemption decisions in 1983-84 deserve mention. In Crow v. Wain-
wright, 720 F.2d 1224 (1lth Cir. 1983), the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit overturned a state "stolen property" conviction that resulted from
the defendant's tape piracy. The court held that the "stolen property rights" at issue
were equivalent to the exclusive rights under copyright to reproduce and distribute
copies of a sound recording;, application of the state law therefore was preempted. By
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state claims addressing the breach of a confidential relationship or implied
contract therefore affords some protection in sufficiently egregious circum-
stances, even where no copyright violation has occurred.
CONCLUSION
During the October 1984 Term, the United States Supreme Court had
on its calendar three copyright cases. Although the Court in recent years has
declined to hear, or as in Sony, has avoided squarely confronting difficult
copyright problems, one nonetheless may hope that the Court in the coming
year will provide greater guidance to lower courts and will illuminate some of
the more elusive provisions of the Copyright Act of 1976. After almost seven
years of adjudication addressing the 1976 Act, which became effective in
1978, the federal courts have encountered manifold and often taxing ques-
tions of statutory interpretation. Some of the courts' decisions have clarified
the copyright law, while others have exacerbated the confusion. The coming
year's decisions, whether laudable or lamentable, will certainly afford the oc-
casion for further analysis of the evolving copyright jurisprudence under the
1976 Act.
contrast, in Unite States v. Gottesman, 724 F.2d 1517 (1 1th Cir. 1984), the same court
held that the Copyright Act's criminal infringement provision, 17 U.S.C. § 506(a), did
not displace the National Stolen Property Act, 17 U.S.C. § 2314 (1982). Accord
United States v. Belmont, 715 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2657
(1984). But see United States v. Smith, 686 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1982), which came to
the opposite conclusion.
In Klekas v. EMI Films, Inc., 150 Cal. App. 3d 1102, 198 Cal. Rptr. 296 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1984), a state plagiarism claim arising out of the alleged copying of an un-
published novel in the creation of the motion picture "The Deer Hunter" was held not
to be preempted because the alleged copying occurred in 1977, one year before the
1976 Act's effective date. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(b)(2). By contrast, a state claim re-
garding distribution of the motion picture was held preempted because distribution
commenced after the 1976 Act's effective date.
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